What happens next?

I had my first proper trip to Juba last weekend where I was able to take it in during day and night time. It has a lot more amenities and the bustle of a city and its exponential growth can be felt as you approach it, with more and more informal settlements being built on the outskirts. There is a real sense of industry and brick factories, metal workshops, mechanic etc all over the place there though it seems most of the real resources are still with outside agencies. There are consulates, NGO offices and UN agencies all around. I met a few British Ex Pats at one of the hotel/bars that do a roaring trade serving to accommodate (mostly) the many Europeans or Americans on visits or postings. The presence of their international staff plus Juba’s position as seat of central government probably contributes to the diversity of the populace. Styles of dress vary much more and there is an obvious presence both of South Sudanese of all peoples, and Northerners. I met with Silas Sworo Jo Jo, who has been running the Kimu Charitable Society in Khartoum and now in Juba, for many years, providing vital healthcare and education services to refugees. I also met with Moses Monday John, director of SONAD (Sudanese Organisation for Nonviolence and Democracy) whom I intend to visit in more depth soon as we have much to learn from them in implementing our plans for peace work trainings in Western Equatoria.

I also had the opportunity to meet the soon to be ambassador to Zambia, a Muro guy from Mundri, and was struck once again by the slightly surreal nature of living in a state in waiting. As of July 9th not only will GOSS offices abroad become embassies and consulates, requiring Ambassadors, High Commissioners and so on, but every other aspect of government will be, for the first time, under the direct administration of GOSS. Last week the name and flag of the new state were decided. South Sudan is officially to be called the Republic of South Sudan (ROSS…like Kemp) and the SPLM flag will be adopted as the official ROSS standard. That last point raises an issue I’m struggling to get my head around. The birth of a new state is sure to be messy in some regards. Below I try and make sense of some of my thoughts so far about post-independence governance in ROSS.

Power, Politics and Participation

The new country will likely have the constitutional foundations of a multi-party democracy (there is a committee sitting to review the provisional constitution in preparation for the drafting of new legislation in time for July) and, at least in theory, will be committed to protecting and promoting pluralism in the political sphere, and yet SPLM absolutely dominates every aspect of political life. There ARE other parties, both those who already have a power base in Northern Sudan and newer groupings who are spilt from the SPLM over time, but there representation and visibility is next to none. The future possibilities for a more competitive political climate are uncertain at this time.

The SPLM are, of course, credited with the liberation of the South, although the pursuit of full independence as a position developed over time after attempts at achieving equality within a unified Sudan rather than being the founding goal of the movement. In this however they are almost an extension of the people. The SPLA and SPLM became the vehicle for the wider interests of the Southern Sudanese, which meant fighting on the military and political fronts and eventually negotiating peace with the Government of National Unity in Khatortum under the CPA and working to create the conditions for the independence referendum to proceed safely. In transitioning from guerilla fighters to politicians and civil servants SPLM representative have had a steep learning curve, attempting to build a viable structure for national and regional governance as well as move the party toward electoral success. This dual role has also given them a massive advantage in those elections as the incumbent power and is likely to do so once again in fresh elections that will take place soon after independence. Likewise, whilst GOSS was responsible for administering the referendum to decide the fate of the South, the SPLM was vociferously campaigning to back one option. Neither of these situations are entirely unusual (though the referendum is certainly an incredibly rare occurrence globally) and it would be fair to say that the SPLM has earned its mandate to date, given the incredible sacrifice made in the struggle. Post independence however there is a danger that the leadership of the party may use their roles to consolidate, if not their personal power, then certainly the supremacy of the party. There are varying examples in Africa of the use and misuse of electoral systems to validate a dictatorial party or individual. One positive example in recent times has been that of the ANC in South Africa, which remains dominant in many regards but is held in check by the strength of the constitution that they had a hand in drafting as well as the industry of an active media and civil society. Another more worrying example would be that of Museveni and the NRM party in Uganda (a neighbor of South Sudan) who won another large electoral victory of questionable legitimacy this week after over two decades in power, having originally liberated the country by armed force.~

Post Independence direction

Furthermore when one asks anybody as to the vision of the party for South Sudan beyond the achievement of independence, there are often awkward silences and scratched heads. I cannot yet grasp a clear ideological agenda on the part of the leadership that is shaping economic and social development policies (SPLM had some Marxist influences at its inception that appear to have fallen by the wayside through the protracted conflict and contemporaneous world events like the breakup of the Soviet Union). Leading a new state that will face so many challenges and in some quarters, expectations of failure, is a massive responsibility and not one that can be assumed lightly. Therefore there should be a rich intellectual and political debate within the party as to the way forward, particularly on how the Nation can build an inclusive identity that can unify its diversity of new citizens. In the immediate future negotiations over the outstanding aspects of the CPA; border demarcations, the Nationality of Abeyi which is mandated its own referendum, separate ‘popular consultations’ with the communities of Blue Nile and Kordofan, and then the large issue of reintegrating returning refugees and IDPs (internally displaced people) who are flocking back to the South will surely occupy much of the attention of GOSS but the unique opportunity the new set up presents demands long term vision in addition to an aptitude for political fire fighting.

The Rentier Economy

I have already heard a number of stories about misappropriation of government resources by officials. With many large national infrastructure projects sure to roll out over the next decade or so and over 90% of government revenues currently derived from natural resources, in particular oil,* the danger of resources disappearing into private bank accounts is high and an unfair distribution of oil wealth would surely ramp up existing tensions at local level. If they so wished unscrupulous individuals within the government system could learn from the examples of politicians and civil servants in numerous other states how to enrich themselves at the expense of the populace. There are certain to be foreign figures waiting in the shadows to exploit this possibility for the benefit of their own interests. The demonstration of strong values of transparency and accountability from the top of the political food chain is a must as well as the creation of space for the people to challenge and overturn corrupt practices. In addition to vigilance, invention will be demanded to diversify the economy away from this dependence in future.

Dissenting Voices

state of ROSS will surely hold security as a key priority. The Lord’s Resistance Army from Uganda are still active in the South and there are a number of armed factions in various states who are or could take up arms to destabilise the new government. It may perhaps be difficult to promote a culture of difference and debate politically or a culture of securitization prevails. The distinction between legitimate dissent and criminal activity will need to be very clear in order to allow the peaceful resolution of conflicts in the political arena. An embattled but still dominant SPLM could, in future, also choose to make dissent of any kind very difficult, especially given that most of the army and much of the police will be constituted of former SPLA fighters, not only likely to be instinctively loyal to the regime but coming from a culture of fighting to survive in very volatile situation, without a grounding in the finer points of, for example, due legal process. Again, constitutionally the new country will hold a commitment to respecting, protecting and promoting Human Rights, including that of Participation, it is important that the leadership realize this commitment in concrete action and model an example for all services to follow.

The Upside

To balance this critique I can also offer a few counter points. Firstly I would reiterate the steps taken in drafting provisional and temporary legislation the commitment to diversity, inclusion and transparency that has been demonstrated by Southern policy makers. In my opinion these steps have not only been taken to satisfy the diktats of the watching international community, but to create the infrastructure for a political culture that stands in marked difference to the characteristics of the neighboring regime in the ‘old’ Sudan (not to suggest that Southern politicians in the North have been beyond reproach), That these qualities are not yet fully reflected in practice is understandable at this stage.

Secondly, government or political parties alone will not achieve the growth of a political culture in South Sudan. Civil Society to date has been understandably focused on providing relief and development services to a population often cut off entirely from public goods. As the newly independent state comes to control its own budget, rather than having to wait on funds drip fed from Khartoum, then civil society organizations may find more value in shifting their focus toward advocating for the effective distribution of those resources and the development of plans and activities to develop state provision of Education, Healthcare and so on.^ The independent media is also a nascent force, though with little reach beyond big towns (there is one government TV channel and one national radio station run by the UN so print media is the most reliable force). Furthermore the enshrined power of traditional authorities, particularly Chiefs, though weakened by the disruptions of conflict, has by no means disappeared, and has been assured thus far of protections by GOSS. Thus there will remain an established counterweight of authority to the central government at local level even as local democratic structures and civil society develop.

Finally I would suggest that the lack of strong ideological inclination within the SPLM is reflective not of conservatism or intellectual bankruptcy but of its inclusivity. As a movement with a focused goal it has fostered partnership between diverse communities in the pursuit and ultimately achievement of that goal. Once independence is official that diversity may result in some interesting and exciting new directions. Amongst those people I have met so far in my time are many articulate, independent and critical individuals who are well equipped to push for positive change, whether within the existing party framework or outside of it. Some have even suggested that SPLM will slowly disintegrate over time into smaller and more cohesive political groupings. Whilst there is a risk of those groupings reflecting other cultural divisions within the South this might be a broadly positive development if the SPLM proves slow to respond to internal debate and critique. As with so much, it is too early to tell what will happen.

In conclusion

All of this might sound pretty critical, given that the country is not even independent yet! No individual or party is perfect and the SPLM representatives in GOSS are making large strides in a short time as the day of reckoning itself approaches. They deserve the breathing space to build a truly autonomous and representative. The achievement of independence is generally seen as one step in a bigger process, that of realizing the full potential of Southern Sudanese people and giving them a fair opportunity to develop themselves. The efforts and sacrifices needed to reach this point are in no way to be underestimated or denigrated and indeed should be applauded. More importantly these are strictly personal, and thus flawed, observations based on my own limited experience of South Sudan so far. I very much hope to continue learning from my interactions with friends and colleagues here and from the work we are undertaking and to contribute as much as possible to the resolution of some of these fascinating, but more importantly crucial questions.
On another note…Mango season is fast approaching. I am very excited at the prospect. 

Footnotes
~There are arguments to suggest that many states that run elections are less politically fair or representative than some that are effectively controlled by one individual or party, especially where the introduction of liberal democratic systems is not combined with inclusive economic development. In Africa both Tanzania and Zambia were effectively one party states for many years after achieving independence, under their leaders Julius Nyerere and Kenneth Kaunda, and each achieved substantial gains in building their Nations. Check out ‘War, Guns and Votes’ (Oxford 2009) by Paul Collier for some interesting observations on democracy. As a cautionary note in assessing or comparing politics in Africa it is important to emphasise that in the immediate post colonial period the influence of the Cold War and its key player on development (or lack therof) was massive.

*Research indicates that where the majority of a countries economic base comes from natural resources corruption can become more widespread and a ‘rentier economy’ develops (as can be found in Sudan at present). This process is often stimulated by the actions of external states and companies seeking a short cut to gain concessions for the exploitation of those resources. Professor Kenneth Omeje authored an informative paper on this issue last year ‘Dangers of splitting a fragile rentier state: Getting it right in Southern Sudan’. This is available from the African Center for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD) at www.accord.org.

^Proposals MRDA have pending at present include activities to strengthen the voice of local civil society in the political arena. Ironically a factor that might undermine this process is the influence of international NGOs and Development Agencies (such as DfID, the British government Department for International Development) and their own agendas. Given that they hold many times more resources than local civil society groups GOSS may be pressured into executing plans more shaped by opinion in Washington, London and Geneva than by grass roots voices in South Sudan itself. Local NGOs, to varying degrees also hold relationships with those same agencies and may be able to engage in positive dialogue on such issues with them.